本文使用1998—2007年中国工业企业数据库与省级腐败数据,通过一个简单的模型,证明了在腐败的制度环境下,国有股权可以帮助民营企业避免政府侵害,因此腐败越严重、民营企业越倾向于国有化;并且,盈利能力强的企业更容易受到腐败的侵害。本文发现无论是狭义国有化还是广义国有化都与企业所在地区的腐败率以及企业资产回报率显著正相关;此外,资产回报率越高的企业因腐败而国有化的概率越高。因此,“国有化”可能是中国民营企业面对政府侵害的应对措施。这对我们理解转型国家中民营企业的生存环境与政企关系具有重要意义。%Using 1998—2007 Chinese Manufacturing Enterprises Database and provincial-level corrup-tion data and building a simple model,this paper proves that state ownership will help private firms cir-cumvent government�s violation in a corruptive institutional environment and an incomplete contractual en-vironment.Therefore private firms are more likely to nationalize when government is more corruptive.Moreover,private firms with higher profitability are more exposed to the violation of corrup-tion.We find that both broad-sense nationalization and narrow-sense nationalization are significantly corre-lated with corruption rate and firms�return on assets.Moreover,firms with higher return on assets are more likely to nationalize because of corruption.Therefore,nationalization is the response that private firms use to deal with government�s violation,which will help us understand the operating environment of private firms and government-firm relationship in transition countries.
展开▼