This paper investigates the dynamic effect of equity incentive on operating performance un-der a long-term time frame,and examines whether and how this dynamic relationship between equity in-centive and corporate operating performance can be moderated by property rights,grant motivation and implementation frequency.The results show as follows:Equity incentive can not only exert current incen-tive effect in the event year,but also exist persistent effect in the following 5 years,which presents an in-verted u-shaped dynamic characteristic.Compared with private enterprises,the incentive effect of state-owned enterprises exists a two-year time lagged effect and can only last for 3years.Compared to incentive contracts with more stable and continuous incentive,welfare contracts exist only short-term incentive effect and appear negative effects after the third year.Equity incentive has stronger and more lasting per-formance-improving effect for the enterprises with higher frequency of implementation.%基于长期研究视角，本文在考察股权激励对企业绩效动态影响的基础上，检验了产权性质、授予动机和实施频率对这一关系的影响。结果显示：股权激励存在动态激励效应。不仅在实施当期具有即期影响，在实施后的五年还表现出持续性的激励效果，且在时间分布上呈现出先升后降的“倒U型”特征。相较于民营企业，国有企业实施股权激励后的绩效提升作用较弱，持续期较短，且在实施初期没有即刻显现出激励效应，而是经历了一个为期两年的滞后期。相较于绩效提升作用更强、更持久的激励型契约，福利型合约仅在短期内存在激励效果，并在实施后第四年出现业绩反转，显现出负效应。相对于只实施了一期的公司，股权激励对连续实施多期激励计划公司的激励效果更好，不仅绩效提升作用更强，激励效应也更持久、稳定。
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