Architecting a System of Systems Responding to Maritime Domain Terrorism by Orthogonal Array Experiment

摘要

In this work we solve the problem of architecting a conceptual, cost-effective, near-term system of systems (SoS) to respond to terrorist threats to the United States emanating from the maritime domain. The threats include a weapon of mass destruction smuggled on a container ship, a commandeered ship used as a weapon, and small boats used by terrorists to attack maritime commerce traffic and critical shore infrastructures. We formulate the problem as an assignment problem, which is then solved using the orthogonal array experiment. The optimality of the resulting SoS architecture is validated against a heuristically developed architecture and an optimal effective, but not necessarily cost-effective, architecture obtained also with the orthogonal array experiment approach. The principal results of the orthogonal array experiment method reported herein underline this successful exploratory work in architecting an SoS. This method can be extended to architecting of other systems of systems.